In this paper, we propose new Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) and Protected 
• Session key security: no one except the user and the server can agree to the common session key 48 with a non-negligible probability.
49
• Forward secrecy: when the password is compromised, it does not reveal the earlier session keys.
50
• Know-key security: when the session key is lost, it does not reveal other session keys. This limits 51 the damage caused by a compromised session key to that compromised session only.
52
• Withstanding an off-line password guessing attack: an adversary cannot find an equation to 53 verify whether his/her guess password is correct.
54
The proposed PPC scheme not only satisfies the above requirements but also allows clients to 55 arbitrarily change their own passwords.
56
The security of the schemes in [19, 23] is evaluated by heuristic security analysis. In heuristic 57 security analysis, any successful attack requires a resource level (e.g., time and space) greater than 58 the fixed resources of a perceived adversary. If the protocol survives the analysis, such an analysis 59 is said to have heuristic security (ad hoc security). Obviously, many schemes were often shown to 60 be insecure (unforeseen attacks may occur) after they were first put forward. In view of this defect, scheme, respectively. The computational complexity can be reduced to an exclusive-or operation in our 127 scheme. Their scheme assumes that only two parties agree to a common session key. The two parties 128 directly store the password without using the hash function. In fact, several password-authenticated 129 key exchanges can be used for authentication between the client and the server. However, they do not 130 allow users to arbitrarily change their own passwords.
131
Since a server in a distributed computer system provides service to many users, it does not only 132 authenticate a single user. To avoid the stolen-verifier attack, the server stores H pw instead of pw 133 in a verification 
The Model

148
The model is principally used to formally: (1) define the characteristics of participating entities, (2) 149 define an adversary's capabilities, and (3) describe the protocol. The details are described as follows. 
Description of the PAKE Protocol:
198
In the following, we describe how to initialize the PAKE protocol and how instances behave when an 199 adversary makes queries.
200
Initialize(1 l , 1 k ), where l and k are security parameters (l k). 
SK(∏
In the following, assume that a client ∏ i C and a server ∏ j S execute the protocol. The processes of 211 the oracles are described as follows: 
261
• id ∈CLIENT and S is the SERVER. 
270
• No oracle has been asked for a Corrupt query before ∏ i U accepts.
271
• Neither ∏ i U nor its partner has been asked for a Reveal query.
272
Assume that two oracles ∏ at random (implying that R c is a random number), the adversary A 1 observes that the message 320 id, R c ⊕ H(id, pw) is returned from the Send 1 query, which is independent of r. On the other hand,
321
A 1 can get all the transcripts by asking an Execute query. However, the transcripts that the adversary 322 gets are independent of the passwords. Therefore, the adversary gets no advantage for the off-line 323 guessing attack. The probability λ of the on-line password guessing attack is bounded by q se and n as 324 follows:
The on-line guessing attack can be prevented by letting the server take the appropriate intervals 326 between trials. is the probability of cnt being equal to i (the probability that B has to output z). We denote it by A 1 .
356
Then we have:
If it is assumed that A 1 has broken the AKE security of the PAKE protocol (A 1 outputs a bit b
358
after the Test query and wins), then at least one of the Hash queries must equal SK stored in the Hash 359 table. We denote β as the probability that B correctly chooses among the possible Hash queries. Then
360
we have:
From the above, the probability of B outputting z from the challenge ψ is the probability ε that A 1 362 breaking the AKE security of the PAKE protocol multiplied by the probability α that B outputting z 363 multiplied by the probability β that B correctly choosing among the possible Hash queries.
We can rewrite the above equation as:
From the above analysis, the advantage of A 1 in attacking the PAKE protocol is the probability λ 366 the on-line password guessing attack added to the probability ε of breaking the AKE security of the 367 PAKE protocol added to A 1 making Hash queries with just the right session key by pure chance. The 368 concrete security of the PAKE protocol is as follows:
370 Theorem 2. Let A 2 be an adversary attacking the MA-security of the PAKE protocol within a time period t 371 after the number of Send queries q se and the number of Hash queries q h . Then we have:
where t is the running time of the adversary A 1 attacking the AKE security of the PAKE protocol. 
after q se interactions with the parties and q * h Hash queries. Then we have:
where t is the running time of a CDH attacker B.
385
Theorem 4. Let A 2 be an adversary attacking the AKE-security of the PPC protocol within a time period t 386 after q * se interactions with the parties and q * h Hash queries. Then we have:
where t is the running time of the adversary A 1 attacking the AKE security of the PPC protocol. 
Conclusions
407
In this paper, we have proposed a new scheme to resist the security flaws of the forgery server 408 attack and denial of service attack. The proposed scheme can successfully solve these security flaws 409 with a less computation and, in addition, establish the session key. The provable security is given a 410 thorough analysis in our scheme. In terms of security analysis, it is more convincing than heuristic 
